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U.S. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN COUNTRY INJUNCTIVE AND SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE DECREES*
INTRODUCTION
While there is abundant literature and precedent regarding
United States recognition and enforcement of foreign country mon-
etary judgments,' very little of substance has been said regarding
U.S. recognition and enforcement of foreign country equitable de-
crees.' This is due to the fact that parties rarely seek recognition
and enforcement in this country of an injunction or specific per-
formance decree rendered by a foreign country court.
Common sense dictates that if one wants to enjoin activity occur-
ring in the United States or to compel activity to be performed in
the United States, one should bring suit in the United States and
not abroad.3 Thus the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
* © D. Buzard, 1989. A draft of this article was submitted in completion of the course
requirements for TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, Tulane Law School, Fall 1988, under the
direction of George A. Bermann, visiting (from Columbia Law School) Eason-Weinmann
Professor of Law.
I. See, e.g., NANDA & PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN UNITED
STATES COURTS, ch. 1I (1988); 2 DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, ch. IX (Booklets
I I and I I., 1985); Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition
of Foreign Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW. 425 (1982); von Mehren, United States Practice Con-
cerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977); von Mehren
& Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in the United
States, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L BUS. 37 (1974); Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220 (1972); Smit, Interna-
tional Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44
(1962).
For general information on foreign country recognition and enforcement of U.S. judg-
ments, see generally, NANDA & PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN
UNITED STATES COURTS, ch. 12 (1988); 2 DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, ch. X(Booklets 12 and 12.1, 1986); ROMAN, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN VARIOUS FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1984).
2. Excluding matters of personal status, matrimonial law, child custody and support,
etc. which have been extensively addressed and are generally well-settled in favor of U.S.
recognition and enforcement. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 484, 485, 486 and their Official Comments, Reporter's
Notes, and authorities cited therein, at 616 (1987); JACOBSSON & JACOB (ED.), TRENDS IN
THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1988). See also Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, § 9B U.L.A. 381 (1987), both adopted in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia, and applicable to foreign country decrees.
3. Unless one is bound by a contractual choice of forum clause to bring suit abroad.
See, e.g.. Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Indus., 581 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Del. 1984), infra § II(A);
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posited in 1971 that "[iexisting authority does not warrant the
making of any definite statements as to the enforcement of [foreign
country] decrees that order the doing of . . .acts [other than the
payment of money] or that enjoin the doing of an act."
However, due to the American5 experience of federalism, with its
concomitant full faith and credit to sister states mandate, the same
Restatement assumed:
[A] decree rendered in a foreign nation which orders or enjoins
the doing of an act will be enforced in this country provided that
such enforcement is necessary to effectuate the decree and will
not impose an undue burden upon the American court and pro-
vided further that in the view of the American court the decree is
consistent with fundamental principles of justice and of good
morals.6
Still, since granting equitable remedies is discretion-
ary-enforcement requires judicial supervision which the court may
perceive as "onerous" 7-recognition and enforcement of foreign
country equitable decrees is subject to closer scrutiny than mone-
tary judgments."
After first enumerating the necessary general principles, this pa-
per will examine issues specific to U.S. recognition and enforcement
of foreign 9 equitable decrees.10 It will examine the few cases that
have arisen wherein a party to a contractual dispute has sought to
import an injunction or specific performance decree rendered by a
foreign court.
Abadou v. Trad, 624 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1981), infra § Il1(B)(2).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102, comment g, at 310 (1971).
5. Hereinafter, the term, "American" will signify an adjective of the proper noun,
"United States of America," as opposed to the conglomerate of nation-states on the Ameri-
can continents.
6. See supra note 4.
7. Id. comment e, at 308.
8. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 1, § 11.03[2] at 11-11.
9. Hereinafter, the term "foreign" will be synonymous with "foreign country," as
opposed to one state of the United states vis A vis another, unless otherwise specified.
10. This paper will not address the issues mentioned supra note 2. Nor will it address
foreign bankruptcy decrees and foreign decrees based upon foreign securities laws, which
both are generally recognized and enforced. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d
Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1972) (securities). Nor will this paper discuss recognition of foreign probate and inheritance
decrees, except for the limited purpose of providing needed examples in subtopics lacking
case law from contract. See infra notes 105 & 149. This paper will focus on the more specu-
lative area of equitable relief in the contractual setting.
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I. THRESHOLD CONSIDERATIONS
A foreign injunction or specific performance decree is susceptible
to the same general considerations and/or affirmative defenses as
monetary judgments. One commentator neatly delineated the four
"basic facts"11 concerning U.S. recognition of foreign judgements:
(a) Generally, the law governing . . . is state rather than fed-
eral law."2
(b) A judgment must be recognized before it can be enforced.
(c) A foreign-country judgment generally is not directly en-
forceable in the United States. Usually, it must first be reduced to
a judgment of the enforcing U.S. court and then may be enforced
by any means available under the local law.
(d) The applicable [law] ...is primarily judge-made common
law rather than statutory law.' 3
With these basics in mind, there are other general matters one
must consider regarding foreign judgments. The following is a brief
overview of these threshold considerations.
A. Finality
The first consideration is whether the foreign judgment is final.
Finality is a requirement for recognition and enforcement in the
United States."' A "final judgment" is generally viewed as "one
that is not subject to additional proceedings in the rendering court
other than execution."' 15 Moreover, "[t]hat a judgment is subject to
appeal or to modification in light of changed circumstances does
not deprive it of its character as a final judgment."'"
B. Reciprocity"
Another threshold consideration and possible defense is the doc-
trine of reciprocity. The Official Comment to Section 481, Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
11. von Mehren, supra note 1.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652, state laws as rules of decision; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). But see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
13. von Mehren, supra note 1, at 402 (author's citations omitted).
14. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 481 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]; 2 DE-
LAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, § 9.08 at 20 (Booklet 11, 1985).
15. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481, comment e, at 596 (1987).
16. Id.
17. This discussion, and especially that of comity, infra I(D), is to be read solely
within the present context, and not that of public international law.
19891
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states that "[a] judgment otherwise entitled to recognition will not
be denied recognition or enforcement because courts in the render-
ing [nation-] state might not enforce a judgment of a court in the
United States if the circumstances were reversed."18 A finding of
reciprocity no longer is requisite to recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment, nor is a finding that reciprocity does not exist
any longer a valid ground for denial. 9
Addressing the issue may be a mere formality in the majority of
U.S. jurisdictions. This is because the holding of Hilton v. Guyot,20
which required reciprocity for recognition, has been neither for-
mally overruled nor preempted by federal legislation. Courts may
feel compelled to deal with Hilton since it is the only Supreme
Court pronouncement on the subject.
Federal courts have circumvented the Hilton rule due to the sub-
sequent holding in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 21 which steered U.S.
district courts away from 'federal common law' and urged them to
apply state law in the absence of federal legislation, constitutional
mandate or treaty obligation. Hence, dispositive authority for or
against applying the reciprocity doctrine in cases since Erie has
been derived from state law. Most states have either explicitly re-
pudiated reciprocity or simply do not consider the doctrine as con-
trolling.22 A few states, on the other hand, explicitly authorize or
require its application by statute.3 Thus, the several states have no
single, identifiable rule on the (in)applicability of the reciprocity
doctrine vis-A-vis foreign courts.
The Erie doctrine may now be coming to a demise.24 If so, courts
will have to grapple head-on with Hilton's reciprocity test. How-
ever, the United States would clearly fulfill their interest in having
a single rule by enacting "a clear federal rule pronouncing the de-
18. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481, comment d, at 596 (1987).
19. Id. reporter's note 1, at 598-99.
20. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 18.
23. E.g., Texas (discretionary), Massachusetts (mandatory), New Hampshire
(mandatory as to Canadian judgments). See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 18, at 599; 2 DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, § 9.11 n.16 at 18 (Booklet 11.1,
1985). The federal constitutionality of these statutes is questionable, especially in light of
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (state statutes denying inheritance rights to non-
resident aliens whose countries do not grant reciprocal rights to U.S. citizens [i.e., eastern-
block and communist nations] held unconstitutional as invading Congress' and the Execu-
tive's exclusive province of foreign affairs).
24. "[T]he federal courts are simply ignoring Erie either overtly, by failing to recog-
nize an obvious vertical choice of law issue, or by stacking the deck against the application of
state law." Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1989).
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RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES
mise of reciprocity in the jurisdictional field." 25
C. Other Affirmative Defenses
Other possible affirmative defenses to recognition were neatly
condensed by one recent commentator into the following:
if (1) there is insufficient authentication or proof of the foreign
judgment; (2) the foreign tribunal lacked personal or subject mat-
ter jurisdiction; (3) the defendant was denied adequate notice or
opportunity to be heard; (4) extrinsic fraud was committed in
connection with the foreign proceedings; or (5) the foreign judg-
ment contravenes public policy. 6
The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. cites
from the above lack of personal (but not subject matter) jurisdic-
tion as mandating nonrecognition." Nonrecognition is also
mandatory "if. . . the judgment was rendered under a judicial sys-
tem that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compat-
ible with due process of law." 2 The Restatement embraces all the
other listed defenses as discretionary grounds for denial of recogni-
tion29 and adds two more: if "the judgment conflicts with another
final judgment entitled to recognition,"" ° and if "the proceeding in
the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties
to submit the controversy on which the judgment is based to an-
other forum."31
D. Comity32
The chief threshold consideration is "international comity," or
"comity." Comity is theoretically akin to the intra-U.S. full faith
and credit requirement.3" Yet, it is so nebulous a concept that Pro-
fessor Smit once described it as being "as chameleonic as its legal
uses are varied. 13 4 Chief Justice Marshall saw international comity
25. 2 DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, § 9.11 at 29 (Booklet 11, 1985).
26. Note, Denying Enforcement of a Foreign Country Injunction-Solution or Symp-
tom?: Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Industries, Inc., 17 CONN. L. REV. 703, 705-06 (1985) (cita-
tions omitted).
27. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(1)(b) (1987).
28. Id. at § 482(l)(a).
29. Id. at § 482(2)(a), (b), (c), (d).
30. Id. at § 482(2)(e).
31. Id. at § 482(2)(f).
32. See supra note 17.
33. Chief Justice Marshall spoke of sister-state relations in terms of "comity." See.
e.g, Lessor of Fisher v. Cockerell, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 248 (1831).
34. Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
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as the doctrine "by which the different States of the civilized world,
receive the laws of others, as governing in certain cases of contract,
or questions of a civil nature."35 The doctrine was later explained
by the Supreme Court as being
[N]either a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regards
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws. 36
Thus, while reciprocity looks at what the foreign court would do
with a like U.S. judgment, recognition vel non in terms of comity
can be a signal sent by the American court as to what the foreign
court should do if the tables were turned.3 7
Though nebulous, international comity is the key consideration
upon which U.S. courts rely in current recognition and enforcement
practice.38 One court went so far as to describe it as "serv[ing] our
international system like the mortar which cements together a brick
house."139 Yet, as can be seen on its face, the doctrine-if indeed it
can be labeled as such-does not explain how to dispose of the
question whether or not to recognize, and if so, enforce a given for-
eign judgment. In practice, it provides a vocabulary which a court
can employ in justifying its ultimate decision, though the basis for
that decision may truly lie elsewhere.4
II. INJUNCTION
The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws' proclaimed in 1971,
that no "definite statements" could be made regarding foreign in-
junctive decrees because "[elxisting authority [did] not warrant"
it."' That was actually an understatement: as of that date no case
UCLA L. REV. 44, 53 (1962).
35. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 295 (1821).
36. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See also, Somportex Ltd. v. Phila-
delphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
(1972).
37. See BURGENTHAL & MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL §§ 7-
12, 7-13, at 174-79 (1985).
38. Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW 425, 426 (1982).
39. Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
40. See, e.g, infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 4.
[Vol. 20
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had arisen wherein a party to a contractual dispute sought to en-
force in the United States an injunction rendered by a foreign
court.
A. Pilkington v. AFG
Since the writing of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws,
however, one case relative to the issue has been reported: Pilk-
ington Brothers, Ltd. v. AFG Industries Inc."2
1. The Case
Pilkington, a British corporation, had licensed an interest in revo-
lutionary float glass technology to AFG, a Delaware corporation . 3
The agreement provided that disputes would be arbitrated in
London under British arbitration law. 4 The contract disputes arose
when AFG formed a subsidiary by which Pilkington believed AFG
would export their technology world-wide. Additionally, AFG al-
lowed representatives of a Portuguese company to tour AFG's float
glass plant.45 Pilkington submitted its grievances to arbitration as
per the parties' agreement. Fearing an exposure of their technology,
they requested and received an "interim injunction" from the High
Court of Justice pursuant to British arbitration law.40 The interim
injunction barred AFG from diffusing any information about the
technology or allowing any observation thereof, to or by third par-
ties and/or persons within AFG's own organization who were not
explicitly authorized to handle the technology and who had not
sworn to confidentiality, pending the outcome of the arbitration.47
However, because neither AFG nor its officers had property in
Britain and because AFG's officers were not themselves present in
the U.K., Pilkington feared the British courts would not be able to
enforce its interim injunction if a violation occurred .4  Therefore,
Pilkington sought to duplicate the interim injunction on AFG's own
territory in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware."9
42. 581 F. Supp. 1039 (1984).
43. 581 F. Supp. at 1040-41. Actually, the technology was licensed to AFG's predeces-
sor, ASG Industries, Inc. Id. at 1041.
44. Id. at 1041.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1041-42.
47. For text of interim injunction, see id. at 1041-42.
48. Id. at 1046.
49. Id. at 1042. Pilkington first sought a temporary restraining order which was de-
nied, since -[t]he Court was not convinced that AFG would violate the 'foreign interim
injunction' and therefore held Pilkington failed to demonstrate irreparable injury." Id. See
7
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Pilkington's stateside claim sought a prompt declaration of its
rights under the British Order, and an order of the district court
which would carry the British Order into effect in the United
States.5" However, the district court concluded:
[P]rinciples of international comity do not require, and in fact
militate against, the issuance of a duplicative order that would
interject this Court into the arbitration dispute now before the
English courts51 . . . by assaying its own interpretation of the
[British] order. It is thus inappropriate to issue any declaration of
Pilkington's rights under the [British] injunction.5"
2. The Court's Reasoning
To arrive at its negative conclusion couched in terms of interna-
tional comity,53 the Pilkington court engaged in a tripartite analy-
sis of reciprocity, finality and comity. It then cursorily dismissed
plaintiff's fears of inadequate enforcement in his own forum.
a. Reciprocity-The court first considered the doctrine of reci-
procity and systematically disposed of it as not controlling.54
Launching into the discussion via Hilton,55 the court embraced the
Erie doctrine 56 and looked to Delaware for the controlling law. On
the basis of the Delaware Supreme Court's criticism of reciprocity
in Bata v. Bata,57 the Pilkington court concluded that Delaware
law "would reject application of the reciprocity doctrine in this
case."58
b. Finality-The court next addressed the finality of the British
decree, concluding that the issue was not dispositive. 59 While noting
the general rule, that a foreign judgment must be final in order to
be recognized and enforced here, 0 the court again looked to Dela-
28 U.S.C. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
50. Id. at 1046.
51. Id. at 1043.
52. Id. at 1046.
53. See infra notes 65 & 67 and accompanying text.
54. 581 F. Supp. at 1043-44.
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493, 505 (1960).
58. 581 F. Supp. at 1044.
59. 581 F. Supp. at 1045; but see, infra note 65 and accompanying text.
60. See supra § i(A). The court actually categorized "finality" as a "rule of interna-
tional comity," possibly in anticipation of its disposition of the issue; see infra notes 65 & 67
and accompanying text.
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ware's stance on the question. It found"1 that a Delaware court
would enforce a per se modifiable decree of a foreign nation court."
However, the Delaware cases which enforced modifiable sister-
state injunctions all involved child custody and divorce decrees en-
tered after a full adjudication of the merits; they were only "modifi-
able" upon a material change in circumstances.63 Since the British
injunction-an interim injunction-was granted to aid ongoing ar-
bitration and was not based upon an adjudication of the merits, the
court deemed Delaware case law inapplicable to the issue of
finality.64
The court was then left with the general rule dictating non-rec-
ognition due to non-finality which, as the court inferred, could have
disposed of the case then and there. 5 Yet the court realized that
"[t]here may be a case ... in which a foreign nation 'interim'
injunction could be recognized" and wisely refused to "create a per
se rule against recognition and enforcement of foreign interim in-
junctions." 6 Thus, the court apparently decided the case according
to the finality rule but chose to phrase its decision "under general
principles of international comity."6
c. Comity-By issuing its own duplicative, preliminary injunc-
tion, the court feared it would unleash a new, indescribable beast in
the Pilkington/AFG controversy which could wreak havoc on the
orderly arbitration proceedings underway, and thus contradict the
"principles of international comity."68 To support its fears, the
court proffered three illustrative hypothetical situations.
First, if there were a violation of the U.S. injunction and the
aggrieved party applied to the U.S. court for sanctions, the U.S.
court would have to interpret and apply an order originally
"drafted by the English High Court in furtherance of the High
Court's special role under the English Arbitration Act."'6 9 This
61. On the basis of McElroy v. McElroy, 256 A.2d 763, 766-67 (Del. Ch. 1969) (Del-
aware court has discretion to enforce a sister-state decree), the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §§ 601-639 (1981).
62. 581 F. Supp. at 1045.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. "The High Court order could thus be distinguished as merely an interim order,
entered into in aid of arbitration, and not based on a full consideration of the merits of the
underlying dispute." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also supra notes 36, 38-39 and accompanying text.
68. 581 F, Supp. at 1045-46.
69. Id. at 1046.
1989]
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could "lead to inconsistent interpretations and inconsistent enforce-
ment," and thus "any interpretation of the High Court's order
should be made by that court, not a U.S. district court."70
Second, "the existence of two identical outstanding injunctions
could lead to a race to that courthouse which is perceived by each
party as the more favorable forum." 1
Third, "modifications of an injunction in one jurisdiction could
lead to confusion and procedural tangles in the other jurisdiction. It
is far simpler to have one court receive all applications for
modifications.1 72
d. Adequate Enforcement Mechanisms-Finally, the court belit-
tled the plaintiff's fears of not being able to enforce the British in-
junction in the U.K.,73 although these fears motivated plaintiff to
seek the duplicative injunction in the first place.7 The British court
could still fine the defendant, and the Pilkington court saw that as
an adequate deterrent. The district court also did not overlook the
fact that the parties had contracted to proceed in the British fo-
rum. 5 Yet, again not wishing to create per se rules, the court ex-
pressly left open the question of "whether insufficient enforcement
mechanisms in a foreign jurisdiction of a litigant's choice would
ever constitute grounds for issuing a duplicative interim injunction
at the behest of the same litigant. ' 6
B. Criticism of Pilkington
Though Pilkington provides the only true grist for our grind-
stone, the parties' pleadings and the court's opinion did not render
the case completely on-target. If the court's interpretation of the
plaintiff's pleadings is correct, Pilkington did not seek recognition
of its foreign-decreed injunction; rather, they urged the court to de-
clare its own injunction which would "exactly track the wording" of
the foreign one.77 This may be criticized as a distinction without a
difference, yet the court viewed the distinction as critical: a sepa-
rate American injunction would be "redundant" since the foreign
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
75. 581 F. Supp. at 1046.
76. Id.
77. 581 F. Supp. at 1042.
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injunction "restrict[s] conduct by AFG within the territorial limits
of the United States as well as in England.
7 8
Thus, it seems the only relief available under the Pilkington sce-
nario would be after an actual violation has occurred. After a viola-
tion, Pilkington could petition the U.S. court to recognize the U.K.
decree as having been violated and then to enforce it. Yet it is
doubtful if the Pilkington court would grant relief under this 'clas-
sic' paradigm, for it is no different than the first hypothetical illus-
tration drawn during the court's discussion of comity.79 Apparently,
the Pilkington court would prefer that the British.court first deter-
mine that a violation of its order has occurred, a task too onerous
for the American court,80 before granting any relief. This logic
would dictate, on the other hand, that it would be much more bur-
densome-on both the foreign court and the parties-to make such
a factually-dependent determination while sitting an ocean away
from the site of the disputed activity.
Logical as that may be, parties do assume risks and burdens
when they enter freely into a contract. The court was quick to point
out that Pilkington had contracted to process its disputes in its own
home forum. Yet such a tenacious position can act as a disincentive
to furthering transnational ventures if a party, on the other side of
the globe, cannot count on the judiciary of his counterpart's coun-
try to aid in the resolution of a dispute when manifestly feasible.
What would have been ideal for Pilkington (and probably what
they really wanted) would be to put their British interim injunction
'on file' in the United States, ready to be enforced immediately
upon a violation. This would save precious time in the event of ac-
tion, by knocking off the 'recognition' stage of the proceeding and
going straight to 'enforcement.' Given that court dockets do not ad-
vance with lightning speed, such a gain in time could make the
difference between losing an invaluable trade secret or not.
Thus Pilkington highlights the need for an expedited registration
scheme. Similar provisions are provided by the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgment Recognition Act"' and the Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Acts82-whereby a foreign party can put
their injunction 'on file' before harm occurs. The rendering court
78. Id. at 1046 n.10.
79. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
81. 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986).
82. 13 U.L.A. 149 and 181 (1986) (wherein "foreign" connotes "sister-state").
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would remain the sole court empowered to modify an injunction,83
and a party would simply update its 'file' in the recognizing forum
with any subsequent modifications to the injunction.
Meanwhile, Pilkington serves as another lesson to contract draft-
spersons not to be too quick to choose their client's home forum as
the sole forum for dispute resolution. If it is clear that the site of a
contract's performance or of the activity licensed will be confined to
or principally within the territory of Forum Y, then the choice of
Forum X may be inapt. If the law of Forum X is perceived as pref-
erable, then choice of Forum Y with application of Forum X's law
mutatis mutandis84 may be in order.
C. Pilkington's Impact
1. Obstacle to Recognition
In deciding this case of first impression, the Pilkington court was
careful not to pronounce premature per se rules against either rec-
ognition and enforcement of modifiable foreign injunctions85 or is-
suance of a "duplicative interim injunction" rendered by the propo-
nent's express forum of choice.86 However, the court's reasoning in
this case may lend itself to cursory denial of similar, future
requests.87
Indeed, the negative resolution of the issue presented-which the
court phrased as "whether an American court must duplicate a for-
eign interim injunction, without reference to the underlying dispute,
where there are ongoing and continuous violations of that foreign
injunction" 88-would, on its face, militate against recognition of a
foreign interim injunction in cases even more factually compelling
than Pilkington.
Though AFG was not in violation of the interim injunction, they
specially stipulated that they would cause Pilkington "irreparable
harm" in order to avoid discovery and to present a discrete legal
issue."9 Furthermore, the plaintiff's claim was for a "declaration of[its] rights under the High Court Order"90 and not simply recogni-
83. Compare, supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84. Replacing "High Court of Justice" with "United States District Court," for
example.
85. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 69 & 78 and accompanying text.
88. 581 F. Supp. at 1042 (emphasis added).
89. Id. n.5.
90. Id. at 1046.
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tion of that Order. Thus, a subsequent court, in order to circumvent
Pilkington, will have to limit Pilkington to its facts and its specific
prayer for relief.
2. Int'l Shipping v. Hydra Offshore
Pilkington may already be dissuading courts from issuing dupli-
cative, interim injunctive relief. In International Shipping Co. v.
Hydra Offshore, Inc.,9" plaintiff commenced arbitration in the U.K.
and obtained an order from a British court temporarily enjoining
defendant from transferring possession of the ship.9 Immediately
thereafter, plaintiff sought identical equitable relief in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York."' Viewing such
relief and the means by which plaintiff sought it as "drastic and
extraordinary," 9' the court signed the order but deleted the pro-
posed injunction's operative paragraph.95
Unfortunately, the Hydra opinion does not address this 'denial'
of the injunction per se because the issue was whether or not to
sanction plaintiff's counsel96 for failure to ascertain diligently that
the court lacked jurisdiction.9 7 Though the injunction question was
rendered moot by the court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction, it
would be helpful to know what prompted the court to 'deny' the
'pre'- preliminary injunction by deleting it from the draft Order
which instigated defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The court considered Pilkington and found it "most apposite."9 8
Yet whether the court relied on Pilkington in striking the injunc-
tion or in finding that plaintiff did not act in bad faith99 or both,
cannot be discerned from the Hydra opinion alone. Apparently,
plaintiff cited Pilkington in an "argument for the extension of ex-
isting law."100 Did plaintiff invoke the Pilkington court's refusal to
formulate per se rules against the issuance of duplicate interim in-
junctions and argue that their situation was one in which such rem-
91. 675 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Apparently, Hydra is the only judicial opin-
ion to have cited (at 153 n.8) Pilkington since its publication (signoff date, June 23, 1989).
92. Id. at 148. The opinion does not indicate whether the arbitration was pursuant to
the contract or any other agreement between the parties.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 154.
95. Id. at 148.
96. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. I1.
97. 675 F. Supp. at 150-54.
98. Id. at 153 n.8.
99. Id, The court imposed much lower sanctions than urged because it found that
plaintiff did not act in bad faith.
100. Id.
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edy was appropriate?'01 Did defendant also cite Pilkington in an
argument on the merits against the duplicative, interim injunction?
Did the court, presented with the opinion by either party, read
Pilkington as running against issuance of the injunction? Or did
the court, regardless of Pilkington, cursorily strike the injunction in
its discretion not to burden itself?10 2
To begin to answer these questions, one would have to examine
the pleadings and memoranda submitted to the court. However,
"an action is now pending in state court relating to the same is-
sues" 10 3 and some further exposition of Pilkington's effects may be
forthcoming.
III. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
As with injunctions, there is a paucity of cases in which a party
to a contractual dispute has sought to import a specific perform-
ance decree for recognition and enforcement in the United States.
Moreover, the underlying disputes in those few reported cases fall-
ing within this paradigm involve conveyance of real property, and
not performance of services. As to the latter, there truely is a void
of case authority.'0 4 As to the former, even though there are few
reported cases, the underlying doctrines involved are established
well enough to provide solid guidance.
This section describes the doctrines and cases relative to recogni-
tion of foreign specific performance decrees affecting rights in real
property'0 5 and draws conclusions as to when a foreign specific per-
101. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
103. 675 F. Supp. at 154. A search of the state databases in Westlaw reveals no pub-
lished ruling on this controversy to date (signoff, June 23, 1989).
104. Again, logic dictates that to compel judicially the rendering of a service in the
United States, one would bring action on the contract in the United States (unless otherwise
dictated by the contract's choice of forum clause), where the court of equity is in a realistic
position to monitor the activity ordered.
This observation does not encompass performance ordered by an arbitral panel, which may
be located abroad, and sought to be performed in the U.S. Submission of a private contrac-
tual dispute to arbitration is inherently by agreement (albeit perhaps enforced by a court)
among the parties; it is not unilateral recourse to a court of law. Conceptually, an order
emanating from the arbitration emanates from the parties' contract itself. Therefore, a U.S.
-court asked to recognize an arbitral order engages in an action on the contract, not an action
on a foreign judgment subject to the considerations and defenses enumerated supra § i.
105. No cases (involving recognition of foreign specific performance decrees) are found
in which the underlying controversy was a contractual dispute over rights in moveable prop-
erty. Such controversies, apparently, usually involve claims for damages (money) or are sub-
mitted to arbitration. However, as the several subsections infra will illuminate, a foreign
specific performance decree operative upon personal property should encounter no obstacles
(apart from the considerations and defenses supra § I - I(D)) to recognition and enforcement
[Vol. 20
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formance decree should be recognized and enforced.
A. Sovereignty
Nowhere is a foreign decree more susceptible to scrutiny than
when it involves rights in land. This is because the sovereign has
supreme and unquestioned control over its territory. The territorial
supremacy of the sovereign is "a postulate that has been character-
ized as the touchstone of private and public international law."1 ° It
follows that a "territorial sovereign has a primeval interest in
resolving all disputes over use or right to use of real property within
its own domain. 107
This is due to political as well as practical reasons. As to the
former:
A sovereignty cannot safely permit the title to its land to be de-
termined by a foreign power. Each state has its fundamental pol-
icy as to the tenure of land; a policy wrought up in its history,
familiar to its population, incorporated with its institutions, suita-
ble to its soil.108
As to the latter, "courts are simply not well equipped to decide
property interests or rights to possession with regard to land outside
their jurisdiction, particularly land located in a foreign nation."109
Thus, a foreign court cannot legally try title to land located in
the United States, and vice versa. Such an action by the rendering
forum would be a flagrant violation of the receiving forum's sover-
eignty, and any decree emanating therefrom would summarily be
denied recognition. The rule is so universal that it also applies be-
tween states of the United States: "[t]he courts of one state cannot
in the U.S. This is because movables, wherever located, are "incidental to their owner's per-
son and so to be governed as to title by the laws of his domicile." Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16
N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
Thus, a French judgment, pursuant to the civil law's community property and forced heir-
ship rules, declaring a New York joint-tenancy bank account to be part of decedent's estate
and that the surviving spouse had no right in that account upon decedent's death (spouse
would have automatic sole ownership under New York law) was given full effect in New
York. Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739 (1970) (unanimous deci-
sion). Compare, Wyatt v. Fulbrath, supra, in which New York law was held to govern a
bank account held in joint-tenancy by Spanish domiciliaries but where the plaintiff did not
seek a Spanish judgment, and thus the New York court was the only court of adjudication.
106. Banco Nat'l de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 445-46 (1964) (White, J., dis-
senting) (citing KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 135-72 (1961); HERZ, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE ATOMIC AGE 58-62 (1959)).
107. Association de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1521
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, Cir. J.).
108. Id. (quoting, I F. WHARTON. CONFLICT OF LAWS § 278 at 636 (3d ed. 1905).
109. 735 F.2d at 1521.
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create an interest in real estate situated in another state, nor can
they adjudicate the title or control the devolution of real estate situ-
ated in a foreign state.110
B. Local v. Transitory Action and Jurisdiction in Personam
The mere fact that a dispute involves rights in real property .does
not necessarily remove it from the purview of a foreign court. What
a foreign court cannot do is define or allocate real property rights.
That is the unique province of the territory's sovereign. What a
foreign court can do is examine the relationship among the parties
and, on the basis of the relationship, determine if one owes title to
the other; if so, the court may compel conveyance of the property
between the parties.'
This distinction is often referred to as 'local action' versus 'transi-
tory action,' or the 'local action rule.' A local action involves the
actual creation or redefinition of an interest in real estate wherein
each party seeks the definition most favorable to him/herself. Only
the sovereign over the territory concerned has jurisdiction of a local
action, hence the 'local action rule.' A transitory action does not
touch the property interest per se but focuses on the parties' dispute
over a fixed interest in real estate. The distinction is depicted
graphically in Figure 1:
transitory local
real estate ir real estate
interest interest
V.
110. I THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4 at 24 (Supp. 1980) (citations omitted).
11l. "[Tihe decree is more than a mere order to the person; it is a final determination
of that person's obligation and the obligation can scarcely be extinguished by non-perform-
ance." W. Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 16 MICH. L. REV.
527, 532 (1919).
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In a transitory action, the dispute can be severed from the real es-
tate interest and the property right is given, whereas a local action
inextricably involves the real estate interest and the property right
is variable.
Chief Justice Marshall explained this distinction and its relation
to in personam jurisdiction early in the last century:
[Tihere is much reason for considering [a dispute over title] as a
local action, and for confining it to the court sitting within the
state in which the lands lie. . . . But where the question changes
its character, where the defendant in the original action is liable
to the plaintiff, either in consequence of contract, or as a trustee,
or as the holder of a legal title acquired by any species of mala
fides practiced on the plaintiff, the principles of equity give a
court jurisdiction wherever the person may be found, and the cir-
cumstance, that a question of title may be involved in the inquiry,
and may even constitute the essential point on which the case de-
pends, does not seem sufficient to arrest that jurisdiction." 2
Marshall's views were derived from the English courts' experi-
ence regarding contractual claims to or fraudulent uses of lands in
North America and Ireland. In those cases, the plaintiffs would fol-
low their defendants to England and seek redress there. Though a
court in England could not "enforce its decree in rem," for the
lands lay abroad, "[t]he strict primary decree of a court of equity is
in personam, and may be enforced [against the defendant person-
ally] in all cases where the person is within its jurisdiction."'"13
The conceptual framework of local/transitory action is by no
means outdated. As the Fifth Circuit recently noted, "[t]he ration-
ale for the [local action] rule is as forceful today as it was in Chief
Justice Marshall's time."" 4 In Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corporation,'"
the tribunal swept away any cobwebs surrounding the local action
doctrine, reviewing it"' from Massie to Shaffer v. Heitner"7 via
Pennoyer"8 and International Shoe."9 The court found that the
112. Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 158 (1810). See also, Livingston v.
Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
113. 10 U.S. at 158-59 (citing, Penn v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. 444 (1750) ("Chancel-
lor of England decreed a specific performance of a contract respecting lands laying in North
America.")).
114. Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1987).
115. 821 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
116. Id. at 287-90.
117. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The appellant in Hayes argued that Shaffer "overruled" the
local action rule. 821 F.2d at 288.
118. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1878).
119. International Shoe Co., Inc. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1989]
17
Buzard: U.S. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Injunctive an
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
doctrine "is so fundamental that state courts are not obligated to
give full faith and credit to judgments from either federal or state
courts sitting outside the local state's territorial boundaries." ' 0
Moreover, modern policy reasons compel adherence to the
doctrine:
The local action rule prevents courts unfamiliar with local prop-
erty rights and laws from interfering with title to real property
which must be recorded under a unitary set of rules to keep it
free of conflicting encumbrances. These local rules ensure that
real property actions will be tried in a convenient forum and that
orderly notice to all interested parties-through [local] land
records-will be facilitated.' 21
Though Hayes was a purely intra-U.S. dispute, it does teach an
important transnational lesson. The issue in Hayes "really involved
* a contract dispute .. .which just happen[ed] to involve the
title to real property."
However, instead of bringing an action on the contract, plaintiff
brought suit to try title. 22 The case was remanded for dismissal or
transfer to the district court in whose territory the action lay.1 23 If
this were an action to recognize a foreign decree based on a trial of
title, the suit would likewise be dismissed and the party seeking
recognition would have to completely retry the case in the local fo-
rum. Thus, when trying a dispute involving American property in-
terests, one should double check one's pleadings to be sure the ac-
tion is brought explicitly in contract. Likewise, it behooves a party-
opponent to scrutinize the original pleadings for any hint that the
foreign proceedings actually tried title.
1. Roblin v. Long
The only foreign-rendered specific performance decree brought to
this country for enforcement occurred a century ago, in the New
York case Roblin v. Long. 2 ' The plaintiff sought to enforce a de-
cree rendered by a Canadian court of chancery. The underlying
dispute involved title to a tract in Ontario. The Canadian court
found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to deliver the land
patent to plaintiff. The defendant then fled to New York, where
120. Id. at 287.
121. Id. at 290.
122. Id. at 288.
123. Id. at 291.
124. 60 How. Pr. 200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
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plaintiff followed him and brought suit on the Canadian decree.
Along the same lines as the English cases cited by Chief Justice
Marshall eighty years before,' 25 the court stated that since it had
[A]cquired jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, it pos-
sesse[d] full power to enforce the judgment and decree of the
chancery court of Canada, to the extent of compelling defendant
to convey the lands mentioned in the complaint though the same
are situated in the Province of Canada and without the jurisdic-
tion of this court.'12
Moreover, the court enforced the Canadian decree out of comity
where by such enforcement it would not violate its own laws or
inflict injury upon some one of its own citizens. 27
The Roblin court did not enforce a foreign decree relative to a
dispute over New York real estate but, rather, over property lo-
cated in the rendering forum's own territory. Thus, the one con-
crete case of a foreign specific performance decree being recognized
and enforced by a U.S. court highlights only the foreign (in this
case the American) court of equity's limited powers in personam,
as well as the general consideration of comity.
2. Abadou v. Trad
The 1981 Alaskan case Abadou v. Trad12 8 illuminates the pri-
mary importance of the local/transitory distinction. Though there
was no foreign decree involved, the court sent the plaintiff to pro-
cure one and then hypothesized as to how it would treat a decree
once plaintiff brought one back. A Frenchman (plaintiff), con-
tracted with a Lebanese national (defendant), to joint ownership of
lands purchased in Alaska.' 29 The contract included the parties' re-
spective duties to make payments on the purchase, and provided
that the Beirut courts would be the sole forum to resolve dis-
putes. 30 A dispute arose over defendant's alleged failure to pay.
Plaintiff brought suit "for contribution from and foreclosure of eq-
uitable lien," but in an Alaskan superior court.'' Defendant moved
to dismiss, relying on the choice of forum clause.3 2
125. Plaintiff's brief cited Massie as well as the English cases cited therein. Id. at 202.
126. Id. at 205.
127. Id.
128. 624 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1981).
129. Id. at 289.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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Plaintiff rebutted on two grounds. First, he claimed that the Leb-
anese judicial system was in a "state of disarray" and that he
would be denied due process therein. 133 Plaintiff failed to provide
substantive proof of this, and the Alaskan courts refused to take
judicial notice of the condition of Lebanon's courts.134
Second, plaintiff argued that the Alaskan statute mandated that
"certain actions concerning real property" be brought in that
state.135 Despite the imperative language of the statute, the court
noted the absence of the exclusive language "and not elsewhere."' 36
Moreover, absent evidence of some other factor (e.g., unequal bar-
gaining power) which would render an inequitable result, "the con-
tractual choice of forum clause . . . will prevail over the statutory
venue provision."' 137 This was especially so in light of "the extreme
complexity of the dealings between the parties that necessarily
would be involved in any suit on the contract.""'  The court thus
implicitly viewed this action as primarily transitory in nature and
not local. Therefore, it held that
[Tihe fact that the dispute in this case concerns land in Alaska
does not make it improper to give effect to the contractual choice-
of-forum clause and to hold, as a matter of venue, that Abadou
should first bring his claim before the courts of Lebanon, and that
only if he cannot obtain relief in that forum should he be able to
re-file his action in an Alaskan court." 9
Plaintiff maintained that any Lebanese decree affecting Alaskan
land would be void. 40 The court, therefore, addressed the type of
decree the Lebanese court could validly render. It suggested ave-
133. Id. n.3. Plaintiff's reply was in 1979. Plaintiff asserted "that the legal system in
Lebanon is in a state of disarray and given the difference in the religious persuasions of the
parties, a fair trial could not be had ... because of the political and legal climate there." Id.
134. Id. at 290. In his attempt at bypassing the choice-of-forum clause, plaintiff failed
to meet his burden "of showing that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult
and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court, or
that enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which
suit is originally brought." Id. (citing, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d
498, 503-04 (Alaska 1980); M/S. Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. I (1972)).
135. The statute in question, Alaska Stat. § 22.10.030(a), reads:
All actions in ejectment or for the recovery of the possession of, quieting title to, for
the partition of, or the enforcement of liens upon, real property shall be commenced
in the superior court in the judicial district in which the real property, or any part of
it affected by the action, is situated.
As quoted in 624 P.2d at 290, n. 4 (emphasis added).
136. 624 P.2d at 290.
137. Id. at 290-91.
138. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 292-93.
140. Id. at 290.
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nues of analysis which it would follow should either party bring
back a Lebanese decree for recognition and enforcement in Alaska.
The court stated that the only valid decree would be to compel con-
veyance among the parties themselves, pursuant to the court's in
personam jurisdiction; a decree purporting actually to convey the
land would be void for excess of jurisdiction. 4
If the decree passed this first test, the court would then look to
"the common law applicable to foreign judgments," which would
include " 'possible treaties[,] federal common law . . . [or
d]ifferences in strong public policy [evidenced by a judgment not]
rendered under circumstances which satisfy our own basic concepts
of due process of law.' "42 The court would also seek guidance
from the grounds for non-recognition listed in the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, as adopted by the Alaskan
legislature. 3
All in all, the court was "sufficiently persuaded that since 'the
only state which by the action of its courts can change the title of a
particular land is that of the situs,' the courts of Alaska will ulti-
mately have to decide the enforceability of foreign judgments af-
fecting Alaskan land." 4 Thus, even if between themselves the par-
ties executed deeds to the land pursuant to a valid foreign decree,
the successful party will still have to bring an action to recognize
the decree.
3. Law of the Situs
The Abadou opinion also invoked the possibility that, irrespective
of the underlying contract, the rendering forum may have to apply
the target forum's local law in cases involving title to land."" This
is commonly referred to as the law of the situs doctrine or lex loci
rei sitae-"the law of the place where a thing or subject matter is
situated."" The Alaska Supreme Court was ambivalent to the
doctrine. However, the local action doctrine, in tandem with the
rendering court's limited in personam jurisdiction, bars a foreign
court from adjudicating disputes over land ownership in which local
law is necessarily dispositive.
141. Id. at 291.
142. Id. at 292 (quoting, R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW § 84 at 170-71
(3d ed. 1977)). See also, supra § I.
143. 624 P.2d at 292 (citing, Alaska Stat. § 09.30.120). See generally, supra § I(C).
144. 624 P.2d at 292 (quoting, R. LEFLAR. supra note 143, § 165.
145. 624 P.2d at 292.
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1056 (4th ed. 1957).
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The Alaskan court, unwittingly or not, may have built a safety
valve for future recognition practice. What if, for instance, the Leb-
anese court made a full finding of fact regarding the parties' con-
tract and, based on its findings, came to a judgment somehow
grossly contrary to Alaskan law but not rising to the level of a due
process violation? The Alaskan court could still deny recognition
based on a blind application of the situs doctrine, disregarding the
contractual choice-of-law clause.
Such an application of the situs doctrine should be discouraged.
A Contract is a contract and one is bound by the obligations into
which one enters freely. Moreover, the "thing" or "subject matter"
in dispute is not the land but the contract itself.14 7 If nothing else,
comity should militate against rejection of foreign law due to a
blind application of the situs doctrine.14 8
This discussion is not intended to belittle the law of the situs
doctrine. 49 In a local action not only does the law of the situs gov-
147. See supra § Il1(B) Figure 1 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. For instance, a U.S. court would not
want its equitable decrees denied Lebanese recognition due to failure to apply Islamic law.
149. "It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the State in which the land
is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation and transfer, and
for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances." DeVaughn v. Hutchinson,
165 U.S. 566 (1897).
Nowhere is the situs rule more rigidly applied, and apt to produce inequitable results, than
in probate. For example, civil law provisions for a 'secret will' or 'mystic testament' (see, e.g.,
French Civil Code Art. 976) are completely anomalous to Anglo-American will statutes.
Such wills purporting to devolve American property, executed by residents and/or nationals
of a civil law country and found valid under that country's law by a court of that country,
nevertheless were found void by American courts and denied effect even though no public
policy would be violated by the property devolving as the wills directed. See In Re Panov-
sseris' Will, 151 A.2d 518 (Del. Orphans' Ct. 1959); In Re DiPersia's Estate, 9 N.J. Super.
576, 75 A.2d 833 (1950); Vogel v. Lehritter, 34 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1893).
Fortunately, the recurrence of this situation has now been stifled by adoption of Uniform
Probate Code § 2-506 in Delaware (Del. Code tit. 12, § 1306) and New Jersey (N.J. Stat. §
3-9). The uniform provision reads:
A written will is valid if . . . its execution complies with the law at the time of
execution of the place where the will is executed, or of the law of the place where at
the time of execution or at the time of death the testator is domiciled, has a place of
abode or is a national.
Uniform Probate Code § 2-506, 8 U.L.A. 116 (1983). New York remedied the situation
much earlier through In Re Harwood, 104 Misc. 653, 172 N.Y.S. 296 (Sur. Ct. 1918), aff'd
sub nom Matter of Gay, 188 A.D. 918, 176 N.Y.S. 900 (1st Dep't), affd sub nom In Re
Gay's Will, 125 N.E. 918 (N.Y. 1919). In Harwood, Surrogate Fowler demonstrated that
denial of ancillary probate to a will validly executed under the law of the testator's domicile
actually was a departure from practice established early on in England, and construed ex-
isting New York statute to allow ancillary probate.
This note is intended simply to point up the real problems posed by the law of the situs
doctrine, especially in transnational trusts and estates law. Fortunately, much international
cooperative work is being done to iron out those problems. The United States has signed the
1984 Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition and also the 1973
Washington Convention Providing a Uniform Law in the Form of an International Will,
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ern, but only the forum of the situs may adjudicate. 150 In a transi-
tory action, a foreign court of equity may only exercise its jurisdic-
tion in personam to compel a conveyance;151  the resulting
conveyance between the parties ultimately must be approved by the
local forum.15 2 Thus, the law of the situs doctrine is inherently sat-
isfied with regard to foreign specific performance decrees rendered
upon a contractual dispute involving an interest in American real
estate.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this article has provided useful insights and prac-
tical suggestions to those concerned with American foreign equita-
ble decree recognition. Though there has been little activity in this
field as limited to contract, if the United States' commercial renais-
sance in the global community is successful, it will engender innu-
merable private, transnational ventures confiding technology, skills
and knowledge. These ventures will give rise to disputes demanding
real relief-where money alone will not do. Fortunately, we can
anticipate many of the difficulties which may be encountered and
are in a position to plan accordingly.
The overriding difficulty is the burden involved in recognizing
and enforcing the foreign decree, which American courts may per-
ceive as onerous. 53 One possible means to ease this burden is a
foreign equitable decree registration scheme. 54 Another improve-
ment would be federal clarification 155 of finality, reciprocity and
perhaps comity, thereby providing a uniform, national standard by
which to evaluate a given decree. Foreign parties could thereby
form clear expectations as to the remedies available throughout the
United States.
Discussion has been given to promulgating treaties with our trad-
ing partners, smoothing the way for recognition and enforcement of
judgements between signatory nations. The first effort in this area
was the proposed U.S.-U.K. Reciprocal Recognition and Enforce-
both which the State Department will ask the Senate to take up in 1989; also, the latest
Hague Conference quadrennial session is considering the final text of the proposed Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Decedents Estates. International Law News, Vol. 17, No. 4,
Fall 1988, at 11, col. 2.
150. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 114-15, 142 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text, and § Ii(A)(2)(c).
154. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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ment of Civil Judgments Treaty.151 It was "to be the first in a net-
work of treaties designed to regularize recognition practice in the
United States and increase the recognition of U.S. judgments
abroad."'1 57 Agreement, however, was not reached and negotiations
were terminated. 5 " Before embarking on another like endeavor, the
United States should put its own fifty-odd member household in
order and adhere to one national stance on the doctrines of finality,
reciprocity, international comity, and the law of the situs.
In the meantime, however, prudent contract draftspersons should
give due regard to where the contract is to be performed and should
be careful not to lock themselves out of that territory's fora in the
event equitable relief is called for.159 Litigators must also be very
careful to bring original suits under validly adjudicable legal theo-
ries (vis-A-vis the anticipated recognizing forum)' 60 and to phrase
their prayers for relief in the least 'burdensome' terms possible''
when it comes to recognition.
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